Female labor market activity is dependent on the presence and the age of a child, but how do the determinants develop in magnitude and significance with the child's age? Using German SOEP data from 1991 to 2006 for mothers with young children, the change in maternal labor supply when the child is one, two, and three years old is explicitly addressed. According to the detailed descriptive analyses and the subsequent tobit regression results for working hours, maternal labor supply becomes increasingly responsive to economic incentives -mainly to imputed wagesas the child grows.
Introduction
The current debate about maternity leave policies in Germany centers around the topic of maternal labor supply. Based on the aim of fostering fertility and the child's well-being, it is intended to facilitate mothers the work-life balance when they desire to work. Certainly, the question of maternal employment depends on how much time has passed since childbirth, but it remains open whether this development is linear. Thus it is of interest what determines if mothers return to the labor market and to what extent? Most of all: do these factors change with the age of the baby? For example, do mothers always respond to higher wages?
German mothers reduce their labor supply dramatically in the context of childbirth, although maternal labor supply already increased over the past decades in Germany as in most other industrial countries. 1 Geyer and Steiner (2007) , for example, find that mothers' employment rate drops by almost 60 percentage points in the year of giving birth. This appears huge in comparison to 30 percentage points in the UK, 16 percentage points in Denmark and six percentage points in Italy (ibid. p. 17). As one reason for this dissimilarity, the generosity of the German maternity leave policy has repeatedly been cited (Sonderhof, 2007; Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2007; Beblo et al., 2006) . The German legislation consists of a three year period of job protection ("Elternzeit", i.e. parental leave) for previously employed mothers which is very long in an international comparison. 2 Moreover, benefit payments differ for three phases: First the full salary is paid for 14 weeks of mandatory maternity leave. Second, following maternity leave the mother receives 300 euro monthly. Third, when the baby has passed six months of age the transfer payment of 300 euro is means-tested and is paid up to the age of 18 months at maximum. In addition to these benefits, there is a child allowance ("Kindergeld") of nowadays 154 euro per child. A reform of maternity benefits came into effect in 2007 and childcare policies are under way with the aim of facilitating the combination of motherhood with work. Against the background of current reforms it is thus indispensable to ana-lyze the determinants of maternal labor supply in the first few years after childbirth.
Previous studies frequently focus on the participation decision (Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2007; Bender et al., 2003; Voicu and Buddelmeyer, 2003) or solely distinguish between full-time and part-time work (Ondrich et al., 1999; Kreyenfeld and Hank, 2000) . 3 Instead, the present paper uses a continuous specification of working hours (as also done by Geyer and Steiner, 2007) in order to capture labor supply most precisely. As working hours are naturally censored from below a tobit model is employed. Precise actual working hours are provided by the GSOEP data where the waves from 1991 up to the most recent available wave from 2006 are used.
For the present subject it is a decisive question at what point in time mothers' labor supply is observed. Several studies pool over all mothers and simply control for the age of the (youngest) child (Geyer and Steiner, 2007; Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2005) . Their approach attempts to explain longterm effects of childbirth, whereas here a more short-run perspective on the first few years after birth is adopted. Pooling over the age of the child as the previously mentioned studies do, however, is incapable of detecting potential non-linearities in participation and working hours after birth as indicated for example by Geyer and Steiner (2007, p. 9) , Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2005) and Städtner (2004) . Simple inclusion of the age of the youngest child as one of the explanatory variables does not solve the problem. Instead, variation of the impact of labor supply variables can only be captured if separate regressions are run for different ages of the child or analogously sufficient interaction terms are included. This is done by Leibowitz et al. (1992) who estimate participation rates separately for mothers with children of different age groups. The present study proceeds similarly but -after presenting detailed descriptive statistics and pooled regression results -runs a regression with interactions of all covariates with the separate ages of the child. To my knowledge, this is the first analysis that uses this technique to detect changes in mothers' labor supply.
The results clearly confirm the non-linear development of the coefficients for labor supply in the first few years after birth. More specifically, the wage, which is imputed to account for the inherent non-observability for nonemployed mothers, increases in importance as well as the partner's earnings. This important result implies that mothers grow increasingly responsive to economic incentives. Simultaneously, the labor force participation before birth is strongly correlated with post-birth working hours. Moreover, higher educated mothers and those living in the East of Germany clearly display higher labor supply, whereas surprisingly no such interrelation seems to hold for the availability of informal daycare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the theory behind maternal labor supply. Next, the data are described and descriptive statistics presented. Part four discusses the regression results. Finally, section five provides some concluding remarks.
Theoretical background
In this section the labor supply model with household production (Gronau, 1977 ) is extended to explicitly account for the effect of the age of the child a mother has. The extension of the model follows Leibowitz et al. (1992) who however build upon the standard neoclassical model of labor supply which only allows for market work and leisure 4 , whereas the household production model adds home time. Here, the starting point is given by the individual utility maximization under the budget and time constraint:
where x denotes consumption, C observable characteristics including the number and ages of children, µ unobservable characteristics, and V non-labor income such as partner's earnings. 5 Moreover, a mother can divide her total available time T between leisure, market work H 1 and home time H 2 during which she produces goods with a value f (H 2 ) which denotes a concave home production function. In particular, home production subsumes childcare, which otherwise has to be bought on the market for the price of cc per hour so that her hourly net wage reduces to w − cc. Setting up the Lagrangian leads to the following optimality condition: Leibowitz et al. (1992) observe that "younger children require more intensive supervision" (ibid. p. 117) and from this they follow that the hourly cost of childcare decreases as the child grows (also Weber, 2004 ). This in turn raises maternal labor force participation as figure 1 shows -yet for the case of standard labor supply without household production. Leibowitz et al. (1992, p. 118) Here, the x-axis depicts the age of the baby relative to birth and the wage is graphed on the y-axis. 6 While the market wage w is assumed to remain constant over time (depicted by the flat line labeled A), the net wage w − cc increases over time as a consequence of decreasing childcare costs (line B). Decreasing childcare costs over the child's age translate into a time dependency of childcare costs with δcct δt < 0. Here, in the context of childbirth, the reservation wage is assumed to change over time with a peak at delivery when the distress from pregnancy is greatest and steadily declines thereafter (dotted line). Re-entry into the labor force is determined by the crossing of the reservation wage with the net wage due to the optimality condition that positive hours are only offered if w − cc > w R .
Turning to the framework with household production, figure 2 depicts non-labor income (V ), the concave home production function f (H 2 ) (dotted line), the net wage w − cc (straight line) as well as the indifference curve between leisure and market work. The interaction of these determines how much time is spent in home production, market work, and leisure. More specifically, figure 2 illustrates how participation is determined by the optimality condition that a mother works as long in household production H 2 (movement along the concave home production function to the top left) until the net wage exceeds her productivity at home (point of tangency). Thereafter, working hours are determined from the point of tangency with the indifference curve. Now, as the child grows, external childcare becomes cheaper (cc 1 < cc 0 , see move to dashed line) and hence participation increases unambiguously whereas time in home production is reduced (due to the concavity of the home production function). However, working hours depend on the sum of the opposing income and substitution effect and are thus undetermined from theory, except if a constant amount of leisure is assumed. Source: Own extension of the household model in Gronau, 1977 Gronau, , p. 1107 One crucial assumption of Leibowitz et al. (1992) is the constancy of the market wage rate. In contrast, the depreciation of human capital leads to a reduction of the market wage the longer the mother stays out of the labor force as is endorsed empirically for example by Beblo et al. (2006) and 5 Görlich and de Grip (2007) . This partly counteracts the increase in the net market wage from the reduced childcare costs in particular for mothers who (re-)enter the labor market very late after childbirth. For figure 2 this means that the increase of the net wage from period 0 to period 1 is not as strong as it would be without human capital depreciation. In extreme cases, the effect might even reverse its sign.
The previous analysis is based on decreasing childcare costs as the child grows, but Leibowitz et al. (1992) acknowledge that the costs also depend on childcare availability. Poor childcare availability is a crucial problem in Germany. 7 Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2005) report childcare availability rates as low as 5 % for up to three year-olds in West Germany for the year 2005 and van Ham and Büchel (2004) find a discouragement effect from poor childcare availability on the maternal labor supply. Moreover, Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000) observe that the shortage of supply is more important for female labor supply than the cost of childcare. However, regardless of formal daycare, informal daycare is often available at the cost of a childminder. Alternatively the grandparents or other relatives sometimes stand by to guard the child. Hence, maternal labor supply is expected to decrease with the distance to the closest grandparents of the child as analyzed in Weber (2004); Lauer and Weber (2003) and in the following.
Finally it should be noted that the responsiveness to childcare costs and availability is largely influenced by personal preferences for childcare by the mother herself in contrast to external childcare. 8 In the Western part of Germany more than the majority of mothers believes that small children would suffer from mother's employment (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2005, p. 8) . 9 Preferences and the acceptance of external childcare probably also change as the child grows.
After these theoretical considerations, the following empirical analysis will shed some light on the changing maternal labor supply during the first few years after childbirth.
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Data
The data is drawn from the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) from 1991 up to the most recent available wave from 2006. 10 It is a yearly household panel which includes among many other variables precise information on actual working hours. Approving of the panel dimension of the SOEP, pre-childbirth information is constructed from the wave preceding the year of childbirth in analogy to Lauer and Weber (2003, p. 10) . The possibility that a mother may give birth to another child is taken into account by always employing the age of the youngest child.
The present analysis studies 'only' mothers whereas some other papers include non-mothers as a comparison group (Haan, 2005 ) and a few control for self-selection into motherhood (Lauer and Weber, 2003 follow the approach from Hotz and Miller, 1988 ; also see Djurdjevic, 2005) . In contrast, the procedure employed here has the advantage of allowing all coefficients to vary freely in comparison to non-mothers. Some other studies limit the sample to married women (Geyer and Steiner, 2007; Blau and Kahn, 2007) or women who were working before birth (Weber, 2004; Bender et al., 2003; Ondrich et al., 1999) . 11 However, as pointed out by Lauer and Weber (2003) , the restriction to previously employed women likely introduces a problematic self-selection bias. Therefore this study is not limited to the mentioned subgroups but adequate controls are included.
In order to limit the sample of women to those in childbearing age, only mothers who are between 18 and 47 years at childbirth are included. Births by younger or older mothers are very rare and their labor supply decisions will be influenced to a very large extent by education or retirement plans. 12 For the same reason, namely incomparable labor force participation decisions, women in education or in an apprenticeship as well as pensioners and disabled are also dropped from the sample. The remaining mothers are on 10 However, no births from before 1992 are considered in order to avoid bias from the policy change in that year which increased the maximum time of job protection from 18 to 36 months (Kreyenfeld, 2001; Sonderhof, 2007) . 1991 data is only used for pre-birth information. 11 Geyer and Steiner (2007) use two different samples, with or without previously nonworking mothers. 12 Comparable age groups have been used in the literature, for example by Lauer and Weber (2003) , Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2005) and Geyer and Steiner (2007) .
average almost 32 years old and more than one third of them bears their first child ever, as can be found in the summary statistics in the appendix.
Descriptive Statistics
When analyzing maternal labor supply it is insightful to distinguish between different forms of employment according to the quantity of working hours. Hence, figures 3 and 4 document the share of mothers not working, working in minor employment (1-15 hours), two distinct part-time categories (15-25 hours and 25-35 hours) and full-time (35 hours and more). Figure 3 pictures the large magnitude with which the event of childbirth reduces female employment, namely to 12% on average over the twelve months following childbirth. On average, the employment rate seems to almost catch up to its pre-birth level when the child is three years old. However, figure 4 shows that this result is only true for mothers with more than one child, who display a very low participation rate before birth in any case. In addition, the employment rate of first-time mothers is always higher than the one of mothers with more children during the observation period. Comparing with the results of Geyer and Steiner (2007) , they analogously find a strong negative effect of childbirth on female employment which is partly caught up during the first four years thereafter.
In addition, the present empirical analysis depicts a continuous increase in all employment categories except in minor employment which plateaus at the level of age two, suggesting that low working hours may serve as a 8 stepping stone for higher working hours. This effect is driven by mothers with more than one child. For the same group the following observation is particularly pronounced namely that part-time work is clearly preferred to full-time work after childbirth. This result is supported by the study of Geisler and Kreyenfeld (2005) on the basis of Microcensus data, who however report averaged rates for young mothers which are slightly higher for non-employment and full-time work at the cost of lower part-time rates compared to the present analysis. 13 Figure 4: Grouped working hours for first-time mothers (left) and mothers with more than one child (right) To further elucidate maternal labor supply, figures 5 and 6 illustrate average working hours for all mothers (left panels) and for mothers with positive working hours (right panels). Apart from confirming the higher labor supply of mothers with only one child, figure 5 shows that the continuous increase in average working hours must be due to increased participation rates because average working hours conditional on working persist between 20 and 25 hours. Moreover, for mothers with more than one child there is a notable increase in average working hours at age three of the newborn (from 21.2 to 25.1 hours). Again, this finding can be compared to Geyer and Steiner (2007) who report slightly higher conditional working hours except in a small dip which they detect at age two.
Finally, the correlation between the imputed wage and partner's earnings on maternal labor supply is reported in figure 6 which joins these two covariates since a positive correlation is expected due to assortative mating (Becker, 1991, Chap. 4) . Both panels side by side show that mothers with Before birth At age 0 A t age 1 A t age 2 A t age 3
All
One child More than one child a lower potential wage are less likely to work, but if they do they work higher hours. It is most interesting to note that the wage groups are almost exactly ordered in the left panel, confirming the higher propensity to work at higher potential wages. Additionally, mothers whose partner earns very little appear to work more. 14 Wages are imputed because they are unobservable for non-employed mothers. In order to control for self-selection into employment, the Heckman two-step procedure is employed and the results are reported in the appendix on page 19.
Having established some empirical evidence on the relationship between the age of a baby and the mother's labor supply, the next section will deepen the empirical analysis in a tobit regression analysis.
Estimation and Results
Due to natural data censoring at zero, a tobit regression model is employed where actual working hours constitute the dependent variable. Different regressions are run for the pooled sample (confer table 3 in the appendix) as well as for separate points in time when the baby is one, two, or three years old (table 4) . 15 In fact, the regression results in tables 4 and 5 are based on a single regression in which all explanatory variables are interacted with the age of the child. The underlying model reads as follows:
where each X i contains a separate intercept and the D age denote dummies for age one, two, and three of the child. This procedure is identical to running three separate regressions, but easily permits testing. As the coefficients cannot be interpreted directly in a tobit model, two distinct marginal effects are reported in addition. The first relates to the effect on the actual working hours which takes into account that some mothers may change from nonemployment into employment in relation with the change in the respective covariate. 16 The second reported marginal effect reports the change in the probability of working. 17 For comparison, the employment probability of a mother who has another child between four and six years and was not employed before birth is 6.6 %, 12.0 %, and 20.0 % at age one, two, and three of the newborn, respectively. 18 In contrast, these employment probabilities amount to 40.8 %, 46.4 %, and 45.6 % respectively for a mother who has no other child and had a white-collar job before giving birth. 19 First, the economic incentives as measured by the imputed hourly wage and partner's earnings are significantly related to mothers' working hours in the expected direction. Hence, maternal labor supply is higher when the 15 During the first twelve months after childbirth only 11.8 % of mothers are working at all, so inclusion of working hours from that age was not feasible here. As a mother is usually observed three times, the standard errors are adjusted by clustering on the individual level, as also done by Sonderhof (2007) . Moreover, all multivariate analyses are weighted by the inverse sampling probability. 16 It is calculated as
, see for example Wooldridge (2002, p. 523 ).
17 It is computed as
, see for example Verbeek (2004, p. 220) .
18 The employment probabilities are calculated as P (yi > 0|xi) = Φ potential wage increases, but lower when the partner earns more. However and most interestingly, as the detailed results show, at age one of the baby mothers' labor supply is not significantly related to these covariates, but only from age two on, implying that money does not matter at age one. This new insight indicates that women grow increasingly responsive to this type of economic incentive as the child grows. This is to my knowledge the first study to analyze this effect for Germany, whereas for the U.S. Leibowitz et al. (1992) find to the contrary that the predicted wage is already significant three months after childbirth. It is not surprising that mothers in the U.S. react much stronger on market incentives, because there is no legally prescribed paid maternity leave. 20 Moreover, the non-linear specification of the wage does not prove significant here, neither individually nor jointly.
Next, the occupation before childbirth is also strongly correlated to labor supply thereafter. The direction of the coefficients, which has to be interpreted in light of the reference category of previously non-employed mothers, shows that labor force participation before birth is decisive for a re-entry thereafter. Positive state dependence has also been found for example by Städtner (2004) ; Voicu and Buddelmeyer (2003) and Haan (2005) who finds a strong effect on the extensive, but only a modest if any effect on the intensive margin of labor supply (ibid.). To check for robustness another regression was performed which included pre-birth working hours categories which were significant only if included instead of the occupation. This means that the occupation before birth has stronger predictive power than pre-birth working hours. Still, the conclusion remains the same as of the results presented here and in Haan (2005) (and are therefore not displayed): Participation before birth matters more than hours. In more detail the present results show that self-employed and civil servants display the largest labor supply. For the latter, the higher labor supply could be due to favorable working hours and good part-time work opportunities as argued by Bender et al. (2003, p. 14) . In their paper, they differentiate only between blue and white collar workers and find that the latter take shorter leaves which is in line with the present analysis.
Care has to be taken when the other covariates are analyzed as some of them do not only work directly, but also through the imputed wage. Therefore figures 7 to 9 on page 24 of the appendix display simulated employment probabilities which also take the indirect effect via the imputed wage into account. Again, results for the two before-mentioned reference mothers are shown.
For the education variable the direct and the indirect effect through the imputed wage oppose each other. Hence, as expected from Human Capital Theory, mothers with a higher educational degree supply more labor to the market (cf. figure 7) . Similarly, age also works mainly through the imputed wage and in the direction as expected from Human Capital Theory. Thus, younger mothers tend to enter the labor market somewhat more frequently after childbirth (cf. figure 8) as also found by Weber (2004) .
The largest point estimate apart from the pre-birth occupation is given by the region of residence where mothers living in the East of Germany work much more. However, this correlation is again partly offset by the negative effect of this covariate on the imputed wage (cf. figure 9) . The higher labor supply of East German mothers is explained by the tight labor market which goes along with fear of job loss and the much better childcare provision. Along the same lines, van Ham and Büchel (2004) point out that a discouragement effect from poor childcare infrastructure might be at work in West Germany. Moreover, in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1980s it was common that mothers took up full-time work again one year after childbirth (Geisler and Kreyenfeld, 2005) so that historically grown attitudes could also play a role. 21 Surprisingly, first-time mothers seem not to behave significantly different from mothers who already have another child between four and six years old (reference category), except at age two of the child. This stunning behavior at age two could plausibly be explained if mothers with a child aged four to six have already spent four to six years outside the labor market and therefore re-enter more frequently or at higher working hours than mothers with a younger, older, or no other child. Confirming the expectation, mothers provide more labor with every month that the child grows (captured by the variable for the relative babyage which runs from one to 12 months), although this is not the case in the paper of Lauer and Weber (2003) . They include months since childbirth but find no significant effect on the employment decision for Germany, however working hours are not considered.
It is also astonishing that the proxies for informal childcare (i.e. distance to the closest grandparents, i.e. parents or in-laws) prove seldom significant individually, but still they are jointly significant at the 5 %-level. Correspondingly, Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000) neither find a significant effect of the distance to the grandparents nor of the childcare provision rate. The controls for marriage and foreign nationality prove not significant here.
In a nutshell, the positive correlations of post-birth labor supply with the imputed wage, the pre-birth occupation, and the region of residence stand out, as well as the indirect effect of education through the imputed wage.
Conclusion
This paper investigates how maternal labor supply changes as the child grows. Specifically, changing working hours during the first four years after childbirth are extensively characterized. The focus of this paper is on how the determinants of maternal labor supply develop in magnitude and significance while allowing for a non-linear evolution as suggested by the literature (Leibowitz et al., 1992; Geyer and Steiner, 2007) . Hence, in the present framework the child's age is not regarded as merely another explanatory variable, but instead resembles a yearly sequence of results.
Based on the assumption that older children require less demanding childcare, a model is demonstrated which explains how this observation results in rising working hours as the child grows. Continuously increasing labor supply after birth is endorsed empirically, both in a bivariate and a multivariate framework.
Similar to previous findings for Germany, female labor supply drops dramatically at childbirth to about 12 % and only picks up slowly thereafter (Geyer and Steiner, 2007; Lauer and Weber, 2003) . Participation and not working hours is the driving force for the recovery of maternal labor supply after childbirth. According to the bivariate analysis, mothers with only one child exhibit a stronger labor force attachment than mothers with more children. The descriptive analysis also supports the hypothesis that women with a higher imputed wage work more frequently. Wages are imputed due to the inherent non-observability for those mothers who are not working.
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The econometric approach allows for free variation of the coefficients at different ages of the child and the results confirm the necessity for proceeding this way. The central finding is that the economic incentives given by the imputed wage and partner's earnings matter only from age two on. Put differently, monetary incentives appear not always relevant for mothers. Moreover, the effects of education and age are mainly driven through imputed wages. Additionally, labor force participation and the occupation before birth are tightly related to working hours thereafter as well as the region of residence. Lacking or inconvenient childcare infrastructure are often cited as a reason for extremely low participation in Germany, so it is puzzling that the regression does not find a significant correlation between the proxies for informal childcare and working hours. Surprisingly, the presence of other children and their ages appear to matter only at age two.
These findings deserve further investigation, not least due to the topicality of the subject in Germany. For example, what role does the new "Elterngeld" (parenting benefit) play for the responsiveness to work incentives? Moreover, it would be interesting to analyze a longer time horizon or monthly data if these were available in a suitable dataset. Finally, it is obvious that the next step consists of trying to find a causal explanation for the changing work behavior of mothers after childbirth. 
